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Health-related external benets are of potentially large importance for public pol-
icy. This paper investigates health-related external benets using a stated-preference
discrete-choice experiment framed in a health care context and including choice sce-
narios dened by six attributes related to the a recipient and the recipient's condition:
communicability, severity, medical necessity, relationship to respondent, location, and
amount of contribution requested. Subjects also completed a set of own-treatment
scenarios and a values-orientation instrument. We nd evidence of substantial health-
related external benets that vary as expected with the scenario attributes and sub-
jects' value orientations. The results are consistent with a number of hypotheses oered
by the general theoretical analysis of health-related externalities and the analysis of
externalities specic to health care.
Keywords: externalities, altruism, health care nancing, program evaluation
JEL Classications: H23, I18, C911 Introduction
Sound policy development in sectors such as transportation, the environment and health
care requires an understanding of the nature and magnitude of health-related external ben-
ets. Health-related external benets | sometimes referred to safety-focused externalities
| derive from altruistic concerns people have for the health and safety of others, which
creates utility interdependencies among members of society. The appropriate treatment of
health-related externalities in the evaluation of public policies depends on the nature of
people's altruistic preferences.
Bergstrom (1982; 2006) showed that if people are pure altruists, in the sense that person i
cares about person j's overall level of utility while respecting j's preferences, then under a
utilitarian social welfare function health-related external benets should be excluded from
cost-benet analyses of public programs. Jones-Lee (1992) extended this conclusion to the
case of pure paternalistic altruism in which person i values person j's consumption trade-
os strictly in terms of i's own preferences. If, however, people are pure health-focused
altruists such that person i's concern for person j is limited only to person j's health status,
then heath-related external benets should be included in cost-benet analyses of health-
aecting public programs (Jones-Lee, 1991). More generally, if people exhibit a mixture of
pure and health-focused altruism, external benets should be included to the extent that
they derive from health-focused altruism.
Empirical evidence indicates that health-related external benets are large in relation both
to own-benets and to external benets derived from pure altruism. Studies consistently
nd that people's willingness to pay for an intervention that improves the health and
safety of others is a substantial fraction of the amount they are willing to pay to obtain
the same benet for themselves. Jacobsson et al. (2005), for instance, estimated that
1external benets equaled 15-20% of own-benets for severe health conditions; Smith (2007)
similarly found average willingness to contribute for the treatment of another person equal
to about one-half the willingness to pay for one's own treatment; Andersson (2009) found
that willingness to pay for a trac safety device that would protect the general public
was about one-third the willingness to pay for a device that protected only oneself; and
parents' willingness-to-pay for policies to reduce health risks or provide treatment to their
children actually exceeds their willingness-to-pay for such gains to themselves (Viscusi
et al., 1988; Liu et al., 2000; Dickie and Messman, 2004; Dickie and Gerking, 2007). The
small number of studies directly compare health-related altruism and pure altruism nd
that health-related altruism dominates pure altruism. Jacobsson et al. (2007) compared
willingness to contribute cash vs. nicotine patches to diabetic smokers who expressed a
willingness to quit smoking but also stated that they were unwilling to pay the cost of
nicotine patches themselves. Contributions for the nicotine patches substantially exceeded
contributions of cash, a nding that was robust to a number of alternative experimental
designs. Similarly, Andersson et al. (2009) found that people were willing to contribute
more on behalf of a relative for the rental of a transportation safety device than they
were willing to contribute in cash to the relative. Health, it appears, is a special focus for
altruistic preferences, but the literature leaves many question unanswered regarding the
specic nature and magnitude of health-related preferences.
This paper contributes to this empirical literature on the nature of health-related external-
ities by using a community-based stated-preference, discrete-choice experiment to examine
health-related externalities associated with the consumption of health care. We use a
health care frame for two reasons. First, the primary purpose of most health care is the
improvement of health and in many countries health care constitutes one of the largest
sectors of the economy (between 10 and 15 percent of GDP in developed nations), and one
2of the largest single areas of government expenditure (OECD, 2009). Second, health care
raises distinct issues for health-related externalities. Even purely self-interested individuals
obtain external benets from health policies targeted at communicable diseases (Weisbrod,
1961). Person i derives benet from person j's consumption of health care that prevents
or cures a communicable disease because j's treatment reduces the chances that i will con-
tract the disease. For health care services used to treat non-communicable diseases, which
constitute by far the largest proportion of health care spending in developed countries,
economists have debated two types of paternalistic, \caring" externalities (Hurley, 2000).
Early analyses posited that a paternalistic altruism concerns others' consumption of health
care per se (Pauly, 1970; Lindsay, 1969). That is, the external benet derives from the
other person's absolute or relative consumption of health care itself. Later analyses argued,
consistent with the theoretical literature cited above, that the altruism pertains to others'
health, in which case health-care-related external benets arise only for the consumption of
health care that improves another's health (Evans and Wolfson, 1980; Culyer and Simpson,
1980).
By studying contribution behaviour with respect to both communicable and non-communicable
conditions, and with respect to health care services expected to improve a person's health
versus health care expected to improve well-being for non-health reasons, we shed light on
these unique aspects of external benets associated with health care consumption. As part
of a robustness check, we compare contribution behaviour regarding the provision of health
care to another individual with an independent measure of a person's value-orientation de-
rived from a validated instrument from social psychology (Messick and McClintock, 1968;
Greisinger and Livingston, 1973) that classies individuals on a 5-category scale from \ag-
gressive" to \altruistic."
We nd that, like previous studies, health-related external benets are substantial in re-
3lation to own-benet and that, although subjects exhibit a baseline of general altruistic
preferences, paternalistic health-focused externalities dominate. Similarly, while both self-
ish and caring externalities exist, caring externalities appear substantially larger. Subjects'
contribution behaviour with respect to the treatment of other individuals corresponds as
expected with the subjects' value orientations. Our ndings imply that a full accounting
of the benets of programs that generate health benets should include external bene-
ts.
2 Methods
We use a discrete-choice, stated-preference methodology. The discrete-choice survey in-
cluded three main components: one part pertaining to a subject's willingness to contribute
for the treatment of another individual; a second part pertaining to a subject's willingness
to pay for their own treatment; and a third part concerning a subject's value-orientation.
At the end of the survey subject's completed a short demographic questionnaire.
2.1 Treatment of others
To measure the external benets that subjects obtain from the health care treatment of
another person, we assess subjects' willingness to contribute to the treatment of another
person. The choice scenario had to be designed so that it was plausible that a potential
recipient could not aord the desired health care service and the subject's contribution
would enable the person to obtain the service (without requiring that the subject con-
tribute the full cost). The scenario therefore emphasized that although Canada's publicly
funded health care system covers medically necessary physician and hospital services free
of charge, it provides either no coverage or limited coverage for many other types of health
4care such as prescription drugs, physiotherapy, counseling by a clinical psychologist, and
dental care. Such uninsured services can be medically necessary, in the sense that they
would be expected to improve a person's health, or non-medically necessary, such as a
cosmetic procedure. Obtaining uninsured services can impose a sizable nancial burden
on individuals and families.
Subjects were told that a registered charitable organization had been created to provide
nancial assistance to individuals seeking treatment for an uninsured health care service.
The charitable organization veried that the desired service was eective in addressing the
condition of concern and that there was no reasonable, lower-cost way to treat the condition.
The charity organized its requests for contributions on a case-by-case basis according to
the individuals who had applied for nancial assistance, thereby making it plausible that
subjects would be asked about their willingness to contribute for the treatment of specic
individuals. The charitable organization therefore served a number of purposes in the
choice scenario: it legitimized the contribution request by verifying the condition and the
treatment sought, it made it plausible that a contribution toward only a portion of the cost
could ensure treatment, and it provided a mechanism by which a subject would be asked
their willingness to contribute to specic potential recipients (charities commonly describe
specic initiatives or needs and request donations channeled to them).
Subjects were then presented with a series of choices regarding their willingness to con-
tribute to the charity to ensure that a described individual would obtain treatment. Each
choice problem described three such potential recipients in terms of a set of attributes
(described below), including a requested contribution amount. Subjects were asked to in-
dicate which of the three individuals to which they would contribute or, if they preferred, to
make no contribution. Including the no-contribution option avoided possible upward bias
that arises when people are forced to choose a positive contribution level (Hensher et al.,
52005). To reduce the chances that subjects would make inappropriate assumptions about
the individuals and conditions described, subjects were told that the patients had been
approved to receive donations through this charity and that the potential recipients were
identical in all respects other than those described. Appendix 1 presents the survey.
2.1.1 Attributes and levels
The choice alternatives were described using six attributes (Table 1).
Relationship to Subject. Other things equal, we expect a subject's willingness-to con-
tribute to be greater when the recipient is emotionally close to them. As noted above,
previous work has investigated this with respect to familial ties such as a parent-child
relationship. Because it was a community-based survey and some respondents may
not have living spouses or relatives, we chose a more general framing with two values:
the recipient is a friend of the subject or the recipient is a stranger unknown to the
subject.
Communicability of the condition. The communicability of the recipient's condition
was included to test for selsh externalities. Communicability took on one of two val-
ues: \Communicable," meaning that the condition was highly communicable, mean-
ing that it spread easily from person-to-person by direct physical contact (e.g., hand-
shake) or indirect contact (e.g., germs left on a door handle, counter-top, etc.); or
\Non-communicable," meaning that it could not be spread by from person to person.
Location of the recipient. The location of the recipient took on one of two values:
\Neighbour," meaning that the recipient lives in the subject's neighbourhood; or
\Distant," meaning tha the recipient lives in a distant city. Location was included
for two reasons. First, selsh externalities should be greater when the recipient has
6a communicable condition and lives in the subject's neighbourhood than when the
recipient lives in a distant city. Second, subjects may identify more closely with
someone who lives geographically near and, other things equal, be more willing to
contribute for such a recipient compared to someone living in a distant city.
Severity of the condition. Studies of priority setting and resource allocation in health
care consistently nd that individuals give priority to those who suer from condi-
tions with greater severity (Dolan and Olsen, 2002). The severity of the recipient's
condition takes on one of two values: \Mild," meaning that the condition does not
impair the recipient's ability to function; or \Severe," meaning that the condition
impairs the recipient's ability to function and carry out some activities of daily liv-
ing. Other things equal, we expect subjects to be more willing to contribute for the
treatment of an individual with a severe rather than a mild condition.
Medical necessity of the condition. As noted, there is debate in the health literature
as to whether paternalistic externalities arise with respect to another's health care
consumption per se or only with respect to another's level of health. We therefore
include an attribute for medical necessity that takes on one of two values: \Medi-
cally Necessary," meaning at the treatment of the recipient's condition is expected
to improve the recipient's health; or \Not Medically Necessary," meaning that the
treatment of the recipient's condition is not expected to improve the recipient's health
though it can be expected to improve their overall sense of well-being. A cosmetic
procedure, for example, may aect a person's sense of well-being while not improv-
ing their health. This attribute targets the crucial distinction between health care
services expected to improve health versus those valued for non-health reasons.
Amount of contribution requested The contribution requested took on one of six val-
7ues: $15, $25, $100, $200, $1000, or $2000
2.2 Own treatment
In the second part of the experiment subjects were again reminded of the range of unin-
sured health care services and were told that they suered from a condition that required
treatment not covered by the public system; further, if they had private insurance, the
treatment was not covered by private insurance. Hence, to obtain treatment they would
have to pay for the care out-of-pocket. Subjects were then presented with a series of choice
problems with two options: obtain treatment paying the amount specied or do not obtain
treatment. The scenarios for this component of the survey used the subset of four of the
attributes described previously relevant for an own-treatment scenario: communicability,
severity, need, and payment required. The attribute descriptions were identical to those
used for the other-treatment scenarios.
2.3 Social Values Orientation
In addition to the choice experiments, participants completed a social value orientation
(VO) exercise. The VO instrument originated in social psychology (Messick and McClin-
tock, 1968) as a method for dening an individual's value orientation along individualistic
and collective or altruistic perspectives. In the VO exercise, individuals make a series
of money-sharing decisions between themselves and another individual with whom they
are randomly matched. Based on how individuals choose to share the specied amounts
between themselves and the other individual, people are characterized as Altruistic (maxi-
mize the pay-o to the other person), Cooperative (maximize joint pay-os), Individualistic
(maximize own pay-o with no concern of other's pay-o), Competitive (maximize own
8pay-o relative to other's pay-o) and Aggressive (minimize the other's pay-o). The VO
instrument has been validated and has been used by experimental economists investigating
voluntary contributions in public goods games (Buckley et al., 2001; Oerman et al., 1996).
The VO exercise was based on hypothetical money-sharing (i.e., no money was at stake).1
We use the subjects' VO classication in the analysis of contribution behaviour.
2.4 Experimental design
For the component regarding willingness-to-contribute to the treatment of others, a full-
factorial generic design with ve two-level attributes and one six-level attribute generates
192 possible combinations (LA = 25 * 6 = 192). Allowing for all two-way and some higher-
order interactions, a fractional-factorial design was produced with 24 choices scenarios
of three alternatives plus the no-contribution alternative (Kuhfeld, 2005; Zwerina et al.,
1996). To reduce the burden on subjects, the 24 choice scenarios were divided into two
blocks of 12 scenarios so that each subject saw only 12 other-treatment scenarios. For the
component regarding own-treatment, the full-factorial generic design generates 48 possible
combinations (LA = 23 * 6 = 48) and a fractional-factorial design allowing for interactions
was obtained with 16 choices over two alternative (purchase, do not purchase). Because it
is unlikely that a communicable or severe condition would not be medically necessary, we
restricted the choice set to exclude communicable, non-medically necessary conditions and
severe, non-medically necessary conditions. All aspects of the experimental design were
performed using SAS 9.1.3 built-in capabilities (Kuhfeld, 1997).
1In a recent comparison of responses to the VO instrument based on hypothetical money-sharing hypothet-
ical and responses based on real money-sharing, Mentzakis and Mestelman (2010) found no evidence of
hypothetical bias.
92.5 Survey Administration
The survey was administered to a province-wide sample drawn from the community-
dwelling population of Ontario, Canada. It was administered using a mixed-mode method-
ology in which community participants were recruited using a letter of invitation sent via
regular mail, which allowed us to use postal contact information (obtained from a market-
ing research rm) for a representative, random sample of the provincial population, but
participants completed the survey via the Internet. Participants were compensated for
their participation. The study was approved by the McMaster University Research Ethics
Board.
2.6 Econometric Methods
Choice experiments assume that subjects are utility maximizers who derive utility from the
attributes of an alternative (Lancaster, 1966, 1971) rather than the alternative per se (Lou-
viere et al., 2000). Observed choices may vary systematically with subject characteristics,
which act as conditioning variables: other things equal, people with certain characteristics
are more likely to donate than are others.
The utility associated with a choice alternative is assumed to comprise two components, a
deterministic component and a random component. Letting q denote an individual and i
denote a choice alternative,
Uqi = Vqi + qi
where Vqi is the deterministic component and qi is the stochastic component. The de-
terministic component includes all those observable factors that in
uence choice, and is









Zqj are personal characteristics of individual q, Xqi are the attributes for alternative i, and

ji and k are the utility parameters to be estimated. The stochastic component to utility,
qi includes all unmeasured factors that in
uence the utility of alternative i to individual
q.
The econometric specication used to estimate 
 and  depends on the assumptions placed
on qi. The most common assumption is that qi are independent and identically distributed
(iid) extreme value type I, which gives rise to the conditional logit model (McFadden, 1974;
Hensher et al., 2005). For the conditional logit model, the probability that individual q





where j = 1 . . . J denotes the set of choice alternatives. The conditional logit model
assumes independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), which implies that the ratio of the
choice probabilities for two alternatives is unaected by the presence or absence of a third
choice alternative. This assumption is often violated for choice data (Hensher et al., 2005).
We test the validity of the IIA assumption.
When the IIA assumption is violated we opt instead for a nested-logit specication that
partially relaxes the IIA assumption. The nested-logit model does this by dividing the
overall choice set into subsets, or nests, and relaxing IIA across nests (though IIA is still
assumed to hold within each nest) (Louviere et al., 2000; Hensher et al., 2005). Figure
111 illustrates one way to nest the choices for the other-treatment scenarios. In this two-
level structure, choice at level 1 is whether or not to contribute; conditional on deciding
to contribute, the choice at level 2 concerns which of the three individuals to which to
contribute. Letting d denote the choice alternatives at the top-level (contribute, do not
contribute), the probability that individual q chooses alternative i within the contribution
nest is the product of the probability of the individual chooses to contribute and of the
probability of choosing alternative i conditional on contributing:
Pqijd = P(d)  P(ijd)
Each of the two probabilities on the right-hand-side of this expression is a standard logit,








In this probability expression, IVd is called the inclusive value. The inclusive value repre-
sents the desirability of the set of choice alternatives available if a particular nest is chosen,
and is dened as: IVd = ln
PM
m=1 eVmjd. It links the levels of the nested model, transmit-
ting information about the level 2 alternatives up to the level 1 choice. The d are scale
parameters to be estimated. There are two scale parameters in our setting; one is normal-
ized to 1.0 and the other is estimated from the data. For the specication to be consistent
with the underlying random utility choice model, the estimate of  must fall in the interval
[0,1]. The conditional logit model is a special case of the nested logit model in which  = 1.
Two things should be emphasized about the nested logit model. First, although the model
structure is often described as a series of sequential choices, the model does not assume
12that decisions are made sequentially. The decision tree is simply a convenient way to depict
the model. Second, although the structure of the decision tree often re
ects intuitive rela-
tionships among the choice alternatives, the optimal model structure depends entirely on
the statistical properties of the data, and in particular on the correlations present among
the stochastic terms associated with the choice alternatives. The specication is dened
by statistical relationships, not behavioural relationships. All estimation and calculations
were performed in Stata c 

2.7 Testing Hypotheses Regarding the Nature, Scope and Magnitude of
Health Care Externalities
We test our hypotheses and present our results using three estimates: the estimated coef-
cients; the estimated probability that a person makes a contribution (or purchases own-
treatment); and, using the cost attribute as a numeraire, the estimated marginal rates
of substitution among attributes, which is an estimate of the average willingness-to-pay
(WTP) for each choice attribute (Bennett and Adamowicz, 2001). Both the probability of
contributing and WTP avoid the scaling problem faced when comparing coecients across
models (Swait and Louviere, 1993).
If subjects are wholly self-interested, they should contribute to the treatment of another
person only when that individual has a communicable disease and the subject is at some
risk of contracting the disease. In such a case, only the coecients on communicability and
interaction terms involving it (especially \neighbourhood") would be statistically signi-
cant. If subjects exhibit altruistic preference that are purely health-focused, they should
be willing to contribute only when another person's condition is medically necessary. In
this case, only the coecients on communicability and medical necessity and interaction
13terms involving them would be statistically signicant. If, however, altruism extends be-
yond a purely health focus, subjects should be willing to contribute to the treatment of
another individual even when the individual's condition is not medically necessary. Jones-
Lee (1991) hypothesizes that for people with whom we are emotionally close pure altruism
weighs more heavily than health-focused altruism; but for people who are more distantly
removed, health-focused altruism weighs more heavily than pure altruism. We can test
this two ways: if true, the willingness to contribute to the treatment of a non-medically
necessary condition for a friend should exceed that for a stranger; in addition, the incre-
mental impact of medical necessity on the willingness to contribute should be smaller for
a friend than for a stranger. Finally, if contribution behaviour is related to underlying
value-orientations, as one would expect, those classied as altruistic or cooperative should
be more willing to contribute to the treatment of another than should those classied as
individualistic, competitive or aggressive.
3 Results
3.1 Sample descriptive statistics
The sample includes 268 respondents, which is adequate for robust estimation (Hensher
et al., 2005). Descriptive statistics for the sample are given in Table 2. The sample has
a mean age of 52, 59% are males, 60% report excellent or very good health, 75% are
married; 76% are post-secondary graduates (university, college, professional/trade-school),
56% have full-time jobs and 82% own their house. Less than 10% of the respondent
households earn less than $20,000 per year, 15% earn between $20,000 and $50,000, 33%
earn between $50,000 and $100,000, 25% earn over $100,000, and 20% did not report their
14income. The values-orientation scores classify 1% as aggressive, 1% as competitive, 26%
as individualistic, 66% as cooperative and 7% as altruistic, which is consistent with the
common nding that most people are cooperative or individualistic. Comparison of our
sample with data from the Ontario component of the Canadian Census and the Canadian
Community Health Survey conrms that our sample broadly corresponds to the population
with respect to age, employment status, home ownership, health sector employment, and
self-assessed health status, but that relative to the Ontario population it includes a higher
proportion of males (58% vs. 48.2%), a higher proportion of married individuals (75% vs.
52%) and is better educated (e.g., 44% vs. 25% university graduates).
3.2 Regression Results
3.2.1 Other-treatment Choices
a. Analysis for Full Sample
A test of the IIA assumption for the conditional logit model rejects IIA (2 = 24.64, p
= 0.00). We therefore present the results from the nested logit model with the structure
depicted in Figure 1. Column 1 of Table 3 presents the coecient estimates for the analysis
of responses for the full sample. The top panel presents the estimates regarding the decision
of whether or not to contribute; the bottom panel presents the estimates regarding the
impact of the attributes on subjects' decisions. The inclusive value () is 0.661, which is
statistically dierent from both 0 and 1, conrming that the specication is consistent with
utility-maximizing behaviour.
The positive coecient on the alternative-specic constant (0.683), which represents the
average likelihood of contributing across all scenarios assessed, indicates a strong propensity
15to contribute for the treatment of another. 2 Its magnitude implies that, other things equal,
the odds that a subject will contribute are twice the odds that they will not contribute.
The likelihood of contributing, however, varies with personal characteristics. As expected,
those with altruistic or cooperative value-orientations are more likely to contribute to the
treatment of another person than are those with individualistic, competitive or aggressive
value-orientations (odds-ratio (OR) = 1.57). Males are less likely to contribute than are
females (OR = 0.80). Age is associated with increased rates of contributing. Those in very
good or excellent health are less likely to contribute than are those in poor, fair or good
health (OR = 0.72).3 Those who are married are less likely to contribute (OR = 0.78), as
are those who own their own home (OR = 0.50). The income relationship is not monotonic:
subjects with household income of $20,000 - $50,000 are less likely to contribute than are
those with household income of less than $20,000 (OR = 0.31), but those with household
income over $50,000 are more likely to contribute.
The estimates relating to the scenario attributes reveal that each of communicability, sever-
ity, medical necessity, friendship and contribution level exert a statistically signicant eect
on the probability of donating. In all cases the eect is in the expected direction and is
large in magnitude. To provide an indication of the size of the eects associated with the
attributes, Table 4 presents the probability that a respondent would make a donation to an
individual with the characteristics listed. The rst scenario listed serves as a baseline, and
refers to the probability of making a contribution of $25 to a stranger living in a distant
city who suers from a mild, non-communicable, not medically necessary condition.4 The
2Because qualitative variables are eects-coded, the intercept represents a true average eect and is not
confounded by the reference categories of qualitative variables.
3This may be due to empathy. Jacobsson et al.(2007) found that empathy was the primary motive for
contributing to the treatment of another and those in poorer health may have greater empathy for another
person seeking treatment.
4All scenarios assign a value of \0" to each of the personal characteristics. The choice of characteristics
aects the probability of contributing, but because this is constant across all scenarios compared, dierences
in probabilities across scenarios can be ascribed solely to the dierences in attributes. The specic choice
16probability that a respondent would contribute $25 in such a scenario is 0.49. Changing
the condition from mild to severe while keeping all other attributes at their baseline levels
increases the probability of a contribution to 0.67, a change of 0.18 or 37% over the base-
line. The impact of severity, medical necessity and friendship are roughly equal and slightly
larger than that associated with communicability. The impact of contribution requested is,
as expected, negative and signicant. The three panels of Table 4 correspond to dierent
levels of nancial contribution. The dierences in the probability between $25 and $1000
are unexpectedly small; the probability of donating in the baseline scenario is 0.35 even for
a $1000 contribution. This suggests that subjects gave less-than-expected weight to the
contribution attribute, a point we will return to below.
Subjects were willing to contribute more for the treatment of another person with a com-
municable disease than an otherwise identical person with a non-communicable disease.
However, the coecient on the interaction term between communicability and neighbour-
hood, though positive and consistent with selsh external benets, is not statistically
signicant. This suggests that the increased willingness-to-contribute for the treatment
of a communicable disease derives less from selsh external benets than from a form of
health-focused altruism: compared to a non-communicable disease, treating a communica-
ble disease is more important because it reduces the chances that it will be spread to other
individuals.
The signicant coecients on severity, medical necessity and friendship conrm that selsh
motives are not the only source of external benets since subjects were willing to contribute
to the treatment of a person with a non-communicable condition. Further, the fact that
subjects are willing to contribute even for non-medically necessary conditions indicates al-
scenario simulated is that between \Do not contribute" and three identical contribution alternatives with
the attributes listed. The probability listed is that from level 1 of the decision tree: contribute to any one
of the three contribution alternatives or do not contribute.
17truistic preferences are not restricted to health eects. The pattern of coecients indicates
that external benets are larger for the treatment of medically necessary conditions that
improve the recipient's health than for non-medically necessary treatments. Health-related
altruism dominates general altruism. The interaction terms reveal more subtle patterns
of eects consistent with much of the theoretical literature. The negative and statistically
signicant coecient on the interaction term for friend and medical necessity supports
the conjecture of Jones-Lee (1992) that health-focused externalities are smaller relative to
pure altruistic preferences for those with whom one is emotionally close than they are for
strangers. The combination of a large positive \main" eect for friendship and the nega-
tive coecient on the interaction term with medical necessity implies that the incremental
eect of medical necessity on the probability of making a contribution is larger when the
recipient is a stranger than when they are a friend. That is, health-focused externalities
gure more importantly in decisions regarding a contribution to a stranger. The interaction
of medical necessity with neighborhood indicates that although respondents are no more
likely to contribute for the treatment of someone in the neighbourhood (vs. someone in
a distant city) for non-medically necessary conditions, they are more likely to do so when
the condition is medically necessary.
b. Sub-group Analysis by Value-orientation
Columns 2 and 3 for Table 3 present separate estimates for those whose value-orientation
is altruistic or cooperative (hereafter referred to as \altruists") and those whose value-
orientation is individualistic, competitive or aggressive (hereafter referred to as \individu-
alists"). Two aspects of the estimates are noteworthy. First, the estimated constant terms
indicate that altruists are much more likely to contribute than the average subject (con-
stant = 1.491, OR = 4.44), while individualists are less likely to contribute (constant =
-1.673, OR = 0.19). The baseline scenario in Table 4 indicates that altruists are ve times
18more likely to contribute than are individualists. Second, contribution behaviour among
altruists is more homogeneous than it is among individualists: for altruists contributions
vary systematically only with housing tenure and income; for individualists, contributions
vary with respect to all measured personal characteristics.
The estimated coecients on the attribute variables exhibit the expected patterns. The
estimates are statistically signicant for many of the same attribute variables, with the
same sign for both altruistic subjects and individualistic subjects. But notably, medical
necessity is not statistically signicant for altruistic subjects while it is for individualis-
tic subjects: those with altruistic value orientations are as likely to contribute for non-
medically necessary conditions as for medically necessary conditions. The point estimates
for the interaction terms involving communicability are substantially larger for those with
individualistic orientations than for those with altruistic orientations, though only the com-
municability*severity interaction reaches statistical signicance.5 These results imply that
selsh externalities are relatively stronger (even if still less than caring externalities) among
those with individualistic orientations.
3.2.2 Own-treatment Choices
Column 4 of Table 3 presents the results for the own-treatment choices. Because the
own-treatment choice scenario involved a simple pair-wise choice of whether to obtain
treatment at the stated cost or opt to not obtain treatment, choices were analyzed using
a conditonal logit model. We present the results for only the full-sample model as own-
treatment decisions did not dier by value-orientation.
Across all responses, individuals are more likely to treat themselves than to forgo treatment
5This may in part be a power issue as individualists constitute a smaller proportion of the sample.
19(constant = 0.599; OR = 1.82). Income is the most important subject characteristic
aecting choice. Although the income gradient is 
at at low- and middle-income levels,
subjects with household income greater than $100,000 are much more likely to purchase
care for themselves (OR = 2.21). Those in very good or excellent health are more likely to
purchase treatment than are those in poor, fair or good health (OR = 1.30), while those
who are married are less likely than are those who are not married (OR = 0.64). Cost has
the expected negative eect on the likelihood that a subject purchases care.
The probability of purchasing treatment for the baseline scenario of a non-communicable,
mild, non-medically necessary condition is 0.239, which is less than the probability of donat-
ing $25 to another individual with the same condition (Table 4). This somewhat surprising
result may be explained by two phenomena. First, subjects' contributing behaviour may be
subject to \warm-glow" eects (Andreoni, 1990), increasing their propensity to contribute
for the treatment of another compared to purchasing treatment for themselves. Second,
subjects may be disinclined from treating themselves for a mild condition that is of little
worry to them, but contribute to another who, for whatever reason, has expressed a desire
for the service and therefore is presumed to derive benet from it. To the extent the latter
is true, it suggests that subjects are not pure paternalists even with respect to health:
they are willing to contribute based on other people's own preferences even when those
preferences dier from the subject's preferences.
All four scenario attributes aect choices in the expected direction: respondents are more
likely to choose treatment for a condition that is communicable (OR = 1.64), severe (OR
= 3.82) or medically necessary (OR = 14.50), and, other things equal, are less likely to
choose treatment as the cost rises. The only interaction term that retained signicance
in the model was that between communicability and severity, which has a negative sign:
the incremental impact of communicability is less for a severe condition than it is for a
20mild condition (and vice-versa). This is plausible as a person is likely to obtain treatment
for a severe condition regardless of whether it is communicable or non-communicable; but
for a mild condition | for which a person might forgo treatment if non-communicable
| communicability exerts a larger impact. This may re
ect a type of other-regarding
preferences: out of consideration for the possible impact on others, at the margin subjects
are more willing to obtain treatment for a communicable condition they would not other-
wise treat if it were non-communicable. The patterns of probability estimates presented
in Table 4 indicate that the incremental impact severity and medical necessity, is larger
for the decision to treat oneself than it is for the decision to contribute to the treatment
of another. Furthermore, comparing the estimates across the $25, $100 and $1000 pan-
els reveals amount of contribution exerts a stronger negative impact on the likelihood of
purchasing own-treatment than the likelihood of contributing to the treatment of another.
Other things equal, the ratio of probabilities paying $1000 for own treatment and paying
$25 is smaller than is the same ratio for other-treatment decisions.
3.3 Willingness-to-Pay for Treatment of Others and for Own Treat-
ment
Table 5 presents the marginal rates of substitution between money and the indicated at-
tributes, which can be interpreted as monetary average WTP for each attribute. For
attributes involved in interaction terms, the WTP depends on the value of variables with
which the attribute is interacted. When calculating WTP, we set the other variables equal
to the sample mean. We omit the attribute neigbourhood because its impact on choices
was not statistically signicant. To test for statistical dierences in WTP estimates across
own- and other-treatment choices we use a combinatorial approach that provides a simple,
unbiased non-parametric test of the dierence in two distributions (Lusk and Schroeder,
212004). The test is based on drawing 1000 observations from a multivariate normal distri-
bution using the coecient estimates and the variance-covariance matrices from each of
the estimated models and then calculating all possible dierences between the WTP values
that need to be tested. See Poe et al. (2001) and Lusk and Schroeder (2004) for further
details regarding this approach.
For the other-treatment scenarios, subjects were willing to contribute the most at the mar-
gin for the treatment of a severe rather than a mild condition ($1509) and a medically
necessary rather than a non-medically necessary condition ($1410). This pattern is consis-
tent with the broader literature on public views regarding health care priority setting, and
the large eect of medical necessity is consistent with the theoretical literature on external-
ities in health care that emphasizes a concern for others health rather than health care per
se. Next largest is communicability: at the margin they were willing to contribute $1095 for
the treatment of another individual with a communicable rather than a non-communicable
disease. Finally, they were willing on average, to contribute $960 for a friend rather than
a stranger.
For the own-treatment scenarios, at the margin WTP is greatest for the treatment of a
medically necessary condition over a non-medically necessary condition ($2091); next is
WTP for a severe over a mild condition ($1193); and smallest is WTP for a communicable
over a non-communicable condition ($447).
Unlike the coecient estimates, WTP values across the other- and own-treatment are
directly comparable. As expected, the willingness to pay at the margin for a medical ne-
cessity condition is substantially larger for own-treatment decisions than for the treatment
of others ($ 2091 vs. $1410). At the margin, subjects are willing to pay less to treat a
communicable (rather than non-communicable) condition of their own than they are for
22another person ($447 vs. $1095).6 This makes sense if they view themselves as responsible
and unlikely to spread the condition to others but believe that others may not take pre-
cautions against spreading the disease. Harder to understand is the expressed willingness
to pay more at the margin for the treatment of a severe rather than a mild condition for
another person than for oneself ($1509 vs. $1193).7
4 Discussion
Jone-Lee (1992) showed that external benets are relevant in policy analysis only to the
extent that people's preferences are paternalistic | specically health-focused | but peo-
ple are not pure paternalists | they do not impose their own preferred rates of trade-o
between health and money when evaluating the eects of programs on other people's health
gains. By these criteria, the results of this study indicate that external benets associated
with the provision of health care are large and policy relevant. Although the responses
reveal external benets that extend beyond purely health-focused paternalism, health-
focused paternalistic benets strongly dominate. People's willingness to contribute to the
treatment of others with a medically necessary condition for which the treatment can be
expected to improve health is substantially higher than their willingness to contribute for
the treatment of a non-medically necessary condition. These ndings are consistent with
the conclusions of Jacobsson et al. (2007) and Andersson et al. (2009) that people exhibit
6This does not mean that they are necessarily willing to pay more overall for the treatment of another indi-
vidual, only that the incremental amount they are willing to pay for a communicable vs. non-communicable
condition is larger.
7These estimates are based on the models in columns 1 and 4 of Table 3, which have dierent attributes
in the other- and own-treatment models. The conclusions do not dier when the analysis is based on
models with identical sets of attributes for the other- and own-treatment models (i.e., when other choices
are analyzed using a constrained model that drops \friend" and \neighbourhood." Such a constrained
model approximates a situation in which individuals explicitly ignore the omitted attributes (Hensher,
2006; Hensher et al., 2005)
23strong, health- and safety-focused paternalistic preferences. Although we are not able to
test formally the necessary condition regarding a person's preferred rate at which another
individual trades-o health against money, our ndings suggest that people are not pure
paternalists. Specically, respondents indicated a willingness to contribute an amount for
the treatment of a (generally mild) condition suered by another person that they would
not obtain if they suered from it themselves. Finally, like others who have investigated
the issue (Jacobsson et al., 2005; Smith, 2007), our results suggest that external benet
are large relative to own-benets.
The observed pattern of external benets is also consistent with theoretical conjectures from
the literature. As posited by Jones-Lee (1992), the ratio of health-focused to pure altruistic
benets is smaller for those with whom one is emotionally close (in our case, a friend)
compared to strangers. We nd that people are both more willing to contribute for the
treatment of a friend than a stranger, and that the incremental impact the condition being
medically necessary is smaller for a friend than for a stranger. The more general nding
that medical necessity notably increases the willingness to contribute (for both friends and
strangers) conrms that the focus of concern is health itself, and that externalities are
not associated with health care per se as has been posited by some (Hurley, 2000; Culyer
and Simpson, 1980). The ndings with respect to communicability are consistent with
the conjecture that the control and treatment of communicable conditions create external
benet even in a world of selsh individuals, but they also highlight a little discussed aspect
of the treatment of communicable diseases: caring externalities are also present and exceed
those associated with an otherwise identical non-communicable disease. The strongest test
of selsh externalities in our context | incremental willingness to pay for treatment of a
communicable condition for a person living in the respondent's neighbourhood | is not
signicant. The non-signicance of this three-way interaction is not surprising given that
24such higher-order interactions commonly account for only a small proportion of variation
in such models (Dawes and Corrigan, 1974; Hensher et al., 2005) But we do nd evidence
of selsh externalities among those respondents with individualistic value orientations,
precisely the subset of people for which such external benets are likely to be greatest.
We also nd a incremental willingness to contribute for the treatment of a communicable
condition even when the respondent has little or no risk of acquiring the condition from
the person in question. Because treating such a condition reduces the chances that it
spreads among the population, caring externalities for such conditions exceed those for non-
communicable conditions, a point that has received little attention in the analysis of public
health and related interventions, which has emphasized only selsh externalities.
The fact that our results are in most respects consistent with a priori expectations, both
with respect to the impact of the attributes and to dierences in contribution behaviour
across sub-groups classied by value-orientation, reassures us that subjects understood
the scenarios and responded to the variation in the alternatives presented to them. One
puzzling aspect, however, is the relatively small impact of contribution level on contribution
behaviour in the other-treatment scenarios, and specically, subject's unrealistically high
willingness-to-contribute for the treatment of another. If we observed these eects for
both the other-treatment and the own-treatment scenarios, it could easily be ascribed
to straightforward hypothetical bias. But these eects are particularly present in the
other-treatment scenarios. As noted above, they may arise from a type of \warm-glow,"
whereby subjects derive utility from the act of giving, which has been widely documented
in stated-preference surveys (e.g., Nunes and Shokkaert, 2003). Subjects always saw the
other-treatment scenarios rst, so it is also possible that some type of order eect is present,
though interestingly, recent work that found evidence of sequence eects for private goods
did not nd evidence of sequence eects in the context of charitable donations (Clark and
25Friesen, 2008). Regardless, as long as any such eect, whether from warm glow, order, or
another factor, is constant in the other-treatment scenarios, all estimates of the attribute
eects remain valid. The eect does, however, temper conclusions that can be drawn
about the precise magnitude of external benets relative to own-benets, and suggests
that future research on health-related external benets would be strengthened by the use
of revealed-choice designs involving real contributions.
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31Figure 1: Example of Nested Logit Structure for the Decision of Whether to Contribute
for the Treatment of Another Individual
Contribute Do not Contribute
Alt 1 Alt 2 Alt 3
32Table 1: Attributes for Choice Scenarios Regarding the Treatment of Others
Attribute Values
Relationship Friend: The individual is a friend of yours.
Stranger: The individual is a stranger.
Communicability of Communicable: The individual's condition is highly communicable
Conditon and is easily spread from person to person by direct physical
contact (e.g. handshake) or indirect contact (e.g., germs left on
door handle, countertop, etc.
Not Communicable: The individual's condition is
non-communicable and cannot be spread from person to person.
Location Neighbourhood: The indiviudual lives in your neighbourhood.
Distant City: The individual lives in a distant city.
Severity of Condition Severe: the individual's ability to function is seriously impaired
and the individual is not able to carry out some usual daily activities.
Mild: the individual's ability to function is not impaired
Medical Necessity of Medically Necessary: the condition is judged by health professionals
Condition to be medically necessary. That is, the treatment is expected to improve
the health of the individual.
Not Medically Necessary: the condition is judged by health
professionals to not be medically necessary. That is, the treatment is not
expected to improve the health of the individual, but it will improve the
individual's overall sense of well-being.
Contribution Requested $15, $25, $100, $200, $1000, $2000
33Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std Dev
Age (Min = 16; Max = 92) 52:00 14:10
Male (1 = male; 0 = female) 0:59 0:49
Married (1 = married; 0 = non-married) 0:75 0:44
SAHS (1 = E,VG; 0 = G,F,P) 0:60 0:49
Education (1 = post-secondary grad; 0 = other) 0:76 0:43
Employed (1 = employed FT; 0 = other) 0:56 0:50
Own House (1 = own home; 0 = rent) 0:82 0:38
Household Income
< $20,000 0:07 0:25
$20,000 to $50,000 0:15 0:36
$50,000 to $100,000 0:33 0:47
>$100,000 0:25 0:43







34Table 3: Analysis of Other-treatment and Own-treatment Choices
Other Treatmenta Own Treatmentb
Full Full
Sample Altruistic Individualistic Sample
(a) Probability of Contribution (1) (2) (3) (4)
Altruistic/Cooperative 0:227 0:034
(0:059) (0:061)
Male  0:112  0:021  0:416 0:063
(0:061) (0:074) (0:134) (0:051)
Age 0:007 0:000 0:051 0:004
(0:005) (0:006) (0:011) (0:005)
Excellent/VG Health  0:166  0:097  0:376 0:131
(0:570) (0:070) (0:109) (0:053)
Employed 0:021  0:072 0:382  0:014
(0:059) (0:072) (0:123) (0:056)
Married  0:125  0:139  0:349  0:221
(0:070) (0:093) (0:131) (0:064)
Own Home  0:356  0:287  0:807 0:100
(0:091) (0:111) (0:204) (0:077)
Post-secondary Graduate 0:021  0:145 0:401 0:024
(0:063) (0:086) (0:118) (0:061)
Income 20-50k  0:586  0:596  2:042  0:133
(0:124) (0:166) (0:308) (0:117)
Income 50-100k 0:391 0:041 1:045 0:035
(0:107) (0:153) (0:194) (0:096)
Income > 100k 0:225 0:173 0:414 0:397
(0:128) (0:174) (0:239) (0:015)
Income: Did not report 0:140  0:204 0:946 0:273
(0:115) (0:160) (0:202) (0:100)
Constant (Contribute) 0:683 1:491  1:673 0:599
(0:242) (0:322) (0:535) (0:255)
(b) Attribute Estimates
Communicable 0:331 0:367 0:276 0:235
(0:033) (0:041) (0:060) (0:056)
Severe 0:455 0:498 0:401 0:670
(0:042) (0:051) (0:079) (0:107)
Medically Necessary 0:422 0:465 0:380 1:337
(0:060) (0:077) (0:105) (0:083)
Friend 0:355 0:418 0:257
(0:051) (0:067) (0:085)
Neighbourhood 0:030  0:002 0:093
(0:041) (0:051) (0:075)
Contribution  0:0006  0:0007  0:0005  0:0012
(0:0001) (0:0001) (0:001) (0:0001)
Friend*Severe 0:050 0:064 0:026
(0:020) (0:025) (0:036)
Neigh*MedNec 0:152 0:200 0:073
(0:045) (0:057) (0:077)
Communicable*Severe 0:029 0:001 0:096  0:208
(0:019) (0:024) (0:039) (0:041)
Communicable*Neigh 0:005  0:005 0:023
(0:021) (0:027) (0:039)
Friend*MedNec  0:091  0:150 0:021
(0:043) (0:057) (0:071)
Observations 12864 9312 3552 8576
Individuals 268 194 74 268
Log-L  3218:62  2273:53  899:38  1478:64
Inclusive Value () 0:661 0:701 0:629
L-R Test for IIA in CL model 24:64 13:87 7:52
Notes: aAnalyzed using a nested-logit model. bAnalyzed using a conditional-logit model.
 = p < 0.01;  = 0.01 < p < 0.05;  = 0.05 < p < 0.10Table 4: Probability of Contributing versus Not Contributing for Dened Choice
Alternatives
Other Treatment Own Treatment
Full Full
Scenarioa Sample Altruistic Individualistic Sample
$25 Contribution
Baselineb 0:487 0:647 0:103 0:217
Communicable 0:632 0:794 0:136 0:402
Severe 0:668 0:813 0:168 0:617
Medically Necessary 0:661 0:808 0:169 0:801
Friend 0:676 0:834 0:149
Fr, Comm, Sev, Med Nec 0:958 0:984 0:658 0:961
$100 Contribution
Baselineb 0:476 0:635 0:100 0:202
Communicable 0:622 0:786 0:132 0:380
Severe 0:658 0:805 0:163 0:594
Medically Necessary 0:651 0:800 0:164 0:785
Friend 0:667 0:827 0:145
Fr, Comm, Sev, Med Nec 0:956 0:983 0:650 0:957
$1000 Contribution
Baselineb 0:346 0:485 0:068 0:077
Communicable 0:490 0:665 0:091 0:168
Severe 0:529 0:691 0:113 0:325
Medically Necessary 0:521 0:684 0:114 0:546
Friend 0:538 0:721 0:100
Fr, Comm, Sev, Med Nec 0:928 0:969 0:548 0:881
aOther-treatment scenarios are dened by 5 attributes: relationship (friend, stranger ), communicability (communicable,
non-communicable), location (distant city, neighborhood), severity (mild), severe), and medical necessity (medically
necessary, not medically necessary). Own-treatment scenarios are dened by the subset of 3 attributes:
communicability, severity and medical necessity.
bThe baseline scenario is the lowest-probability set of attributes: stranger, non-communicable, distant city, mild, not medically

























































































































































































































































































































































































































Although Canada’s publicly funded health care system covers most physician and 
hospital services free of charge, it provides either no coverage or only limited coverage 
for many other types of health care. Examples of such services outside the universal 
public insurance plan include prescription drugs, physiotherapy, counseling by a clinical 
psychologist and dental care. These uncovered services can be either medically or not 
medically necessary.  Although some Canadians have private health insurance that 
covers some of these services, such coverage is often very limited; in addition, many 
Canadians have no such private insurance and must pay the full cost of such services. 
This can impose a sizable financial burden on many individuals and families.  
In response to this, imagine that a registered charitable organization has been created 
to assist individuals in obtaining a specific treatment for such non-covered services. 
Donations to the organization are distributed on a case-by-case basis to individuals who 
have applied for financial assistance to pay for the cost of the treatment. In each case, 
the charitable organization verifies that it is effective in treating the individual’s condition 
and ensures there is no other reasonable, lower-cost way of treating the condition. 
 
On the next few screens, we describe a series of scenarios pertaining to individuals who 
are eligible to receive donations through the charity to assist in paying for a treatment. 
In each scenario we describe a number of characteristics of the individuals and their 
conditions. In each case we are interested in your willingness to contribute to the charity 





As noted, each scenario you see will be described by a set of characteristics of the 
individuals who seek the treatment and the condition they have. 
 
Characteristics of the Individual Who Seeks Treatment and the Condition 
 
 
Characteristic 1: Relation of the individual to you 
 
  Friend: The individual is a friend of yours. 
  Stranger: The individual is a stranger to you. 
 
                                                 
1 This presents the choice scenario, attribute descriptions and, for each section of the survey, one 
example of the choice screens seen by subjects completing the survey. The survey was designed and 
administered online in Limesurvey.      
Characteristic 2: Communicability of the condition 
 
  Communicable: The condition the individual has is highly communicable. That is, 
the condition is easily spread from person-to-person by direct physical contact (e.g., 
handshake) or indirect contact (e.g., germs left on a door handle, countertop, etc.). 
  Not Communicable: The condition the individual has is non-communicable. That 




Characteristic 3: Location of the individual 
 
  Neighbourhood: The individual lives in your neighbourhood. 




Characteristic 4: Severity of the condition 
 
  Severe: Severity of the condition is such that the individual’s ability to function is 
seriously impaired and the individual is not able to carry out some usual daily activities. 





Characteristic 5: Medical necessity of the condition 
 
  Medically Necessary: Condition is judged by health professionals to be medically 
necessary. That is, the treatment is expected to improve the health of the individual. 
  Not Medically Necessary: Condition is judged by health professionals to not be 
medically necessary. That is, the treatment is not expected to improve the health of the 




Characteristic 6: Amount of your contribution 
 
  $15 
  $25 
  $100 
  $200 
  $1000 




Part 1: Scenarios Involving the Treatment of Others 
 
As we have described, some health care services are not covered by Canada's publicly 
funded health care system. Please click the link Background Information if you would 
like to review the background information.   
Imagine that a registered charitable organization has been created to assist individuals 
in obtaining health care services not covered by the public health care system. In this 
section, we present a series of scenarios which ask you to make a choice between four 
options. Three individuals have been approved to receive donations through this charity. 
Relevant characteristics of the individuals, the treatment and the donation amounts 




For each scenario we give you four options regarding a possible contribution and ask 
that you select one option: Option A (contribute and treat Individual 1), Option B 
(contribute and treat Individual 2), Option C (contribute and treat Individual 3) or 
Option D (which is to not make a contribution to any of the three individuals). For each 
of options A, B and C, making the contribution will ensure this individual obtains the 
health care treatment because of assistance provided by the charity; if no contribution is 
made (Option D) none of the three individuals will obtain financial assistance through 
the charity and none will be treated. There are no right or wrong answers. 
A few things to note when making your decisions:  
•  Imagine that you are making the contributions out of your own pocket. 
   
•  Treat each decision independently. Your decision in one scenario should not 
affect your decision in another scenario. 
   
•  There are no right or wrong answers.  
To help you understand the questions, we provide an example on the next screen.   
 
   
Example 
 
Here is an example of the kind of decision you will be asked to make concerning the 











Individual 3  Option D 
Relation  Friend  Stranger  Stranger    
Communicability  Communicable  Not Communicable  Communicable    
Location of 
Individual  Distant City  Neighbourhood  Neighbourhood  Do not donate to any 
individual. 
Severity  Severe  Mild  Mild    





Necessary    
Contribution  $50  $1000  $200  $0 
 
 
Please select the option that represents your most preferred choice among options A, B, C and D: 
  O: Option A        
  O: Option B      
  O: Option C      
  O: Option D 
 
                                                 
2 Subjects saw tables identical to these in the online Limesurvey version  
Explanation 
  
If you choose Option A, you indicate that, of the four options listed, you would most 
prefer to contribute $50 to fund the medically necessary treatment of a friend who lives 
in a distant city and suffers from a severe, communicable condition. 
  
If you choose Option B, you indicate that, of the four options listed, you would most 
prefer to contribute $1000 to fund the treatment of someone you don’t know living in 
your neighborhood who suffers from a mild, non-communicable condition that is not 
considered medically necessary but for which treatment will improve the person’s 
overall sense of well-being. 
  
If you choose Option C, you indicate that, of the four options listed, you would most 
prefer to contribute $200 to fund the medically necessary treatment of someone you 
don’t know living in your neighbourhood who suffers from a mild, communicable 
condition. 
  
If you choose Option D, you indicate that, of the four options listed, you would most 
prefer to not contribute to funding the treatment of any of the three individuals. 
   
Note that we have created reminder pop-up windows to help you keep track of the 
characteristics. Simply click on any of the characteristic labels for helpful information.  
 
(For Firefox users: please note, if you accidently click the back button, you may need to 
refresh and re-send data in order to continue.) 
  
On the following 12 screens, we present 12 different scenarios that are similar to this 
example. For each of the scenarios, please choose the most preferred of the four 

















Individual 3  Option D 
Relation  Stranger  Stranger  Stranger    




Not   
Communicable    
Location of 
Individual  Neighbourhood  Distant City  Distant City  Do not donate to any 
individual. 
Severity  Mild  Severe  Mild    





Necessary    
Contribution  $100  $2000  $25  $0 
 
 
Please select the option that represents your most preferred choice among options A, B, C and D:  
  O: Option A        
  O: Option B      
  O: Option C      
  O: Option D 
                                                 
3 Only one question appeared on screen at a time, automatically followed by the next question once a 




Part 2: Scenarios Involving Your Own Treatment 
 
We are now going to switch gears slightly. As we have described, some health care 
services are not covered by Canada's publicly funded health care system. Please click 
the link Background Information if you would like to review the background information.   
Please imagine now that YOU have a condition such as that described by 
the characteristics and that there is a treatment that will effectively treat your condition, 
but is not publicly covered.  Further, you do not have any private insurance to help pay 
for the treatment. You must pay the full cost yourself to receive the treatment. In each 
scenario listed below we describe a condition in terms of four characteristics: 
communicability of the condition, medical necessity of the condition, severity of the 





For each decision scenario you have two options: either purchase treatment at the cost 
indicated (Option A) or leave the condition untreated and pay nothing (Option B).  
  
Again, please note a few things when making your decisions:                   
•  Imagine that you are paying the full cost for the treatment out of your own pocket.  
   
•  Treat each decision independently. Your decision in one scenario should not 
affect your decision in another scenario.    
•  There are no right or wrong answers.  
 




Here is an example of the kind of decision you will be asked to make concerning your 




Characteristics  Option A  Option B 
Communicability  Communicable    
Severity  Severe 
You choose not to seek 
treatment: you pay nothing 
and you remain in the 
condition described. 
Medical Necessity  Medically Necessary    
Cost of Service to You  $50  $0 
 
Please select the option that represents your preferred choice between options A and B:  
  O: Option A            





If you choose Option A, you indicate that you prefer to pay $50 for the treatment of a 
medically necessary, severe, communicable condition.  
  
If you choose Option B, you indicate that you prefer not to seek treatment, you pay 
nothing and you remain with the condition.    
On the following 16 screens we present 16 different scenarios similar to this example.  
Please choose the more preferred of the two options. Remember there are no right or 




Characteristics  Option A  Option B 
Communicability  Not Communicable    
Severity  Mild 
You choose not to seek 
treatment: you pay nothing 
and you remain in the 
condition described. 
Medical Necessity  Not Medically 
Necessary    
Cost of Service to You  $15  $0 
 
                                                 
4 Only one question appeared on screen at a time, automatically followed by the next question once a 
choice was made and “submit” button pressed.  Participants were unable to go back to revise responses.   
Part 3: Scenarios Involving Money Sharing 
  
 
In this section, we present some hypothetical choices about money. Your choices affect 
the amount of money you receive as well the amount of money received by a random 
person with whom you have been hypothetically matched. You do not know who this 
other person is.  
  
For each question we present two options and ask you to choose one. Each option 
describes an amount of money that you get as well as an amount of money the other 
person gets.  
  
For some options, you, the other person, or both of you may receive negative amounts 
(i.e. lose money). These are indicated by negative signs (i.e. -$5.00 means a loss of 
$5.00). All amounts are in Canadian dollars. 
  
Imagine that at the same time you are making your choices the other person 
is answering the same questions, making choices as to how they would split money 
between themselves and you.  
  
After you have made all of your choices, the final amount of money you would 
hypothetically “receive” is the total of all amounts that you get from your choices plus 
the total of all amounts that you get from the other person’s choices. Similarly, the final 
amount the other person gets is the total of the amounts that you decided to give them 
through your choices plus the amounts that they decided to give themselves through 
their choices.  
 
To help you understand, we provide an example on the next screen.    
Here is an example of the kind of decision you will be asked to make. Two options will 
appear on your computer screen. 
 
 
Option A  Option B 
You Receive  Other Receives  You Receive  Other Receives 
$9.70  -$2.60 
Example 
$10.00  $0.00 
 
 
You must select either Option A or Option B:   
  O: Option A  






If you choose Option A, you receive $9.70 and the other person loses $2.60. 
 
If you choose Option B, you receive $10.00 and the other person receives nothing. 
 
On the following 24 screens, we present 24 different scenarios similar to this example. 
You must choose either Option A or Option B.   
 









Option A  Option B 
You Receive  Other Receives  You Receive  Other Receives 
$7.10  $7.10 
Q1 
$5.00  $8.70 
 
 
You must select either Option A or Option B:  
  O: Option A  
  O: Option B 
 
                                                 
5Subjects completed 24 money-sharing questions as part of the values-orientation component.   
 